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Practice Makes Perfect: Experience-Related
Information Should Fall Within the Purview of
Pennsylvania's Doctrine of Informed Consent
INTRODUCTION

When illness and disease enter our lives, we call upon physicians
and their years of training and experience to guide us through
some of the more frightening and helpless moments of life. In these
moments of life and death, patients, armed with an understandably
unsophisticated knowledge of medical science, believe that
physicians will decipher for them the Latin terminology and
scientific intricacies associated with their ailments. 1 Patients
assume that physicians will explain the potential risks and benefits
of medical treatment. 2 Given the degree to which a patient relies on
a physician's medical advice, is it reasonable for a patient to be
concerned with the extent of training and practical experience that
a physician has with respect to his proposed treatments?
Answering this question for the first time, the Supreme Court of
3 said no.
Pennsylvania, in Duttry v. Patterson,
Although the factors relevant to a patient's informed consent
decision have not traditionally included a physician's practical
experience or level of training, recent advances in the gathering
and comparing of physician-performance data in connection to
probable patient outcomes have become central to the debate
concerning the modern application of the doctrine of informed
consent. 4 Only the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however, has
embraced the idea that a patient's treatment decision is reasonably
affected by the his perception of a physician's skill in performing a
1. Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care
Cost Containment, 85 IowA L REv. 261, 264 (1999).
2. Id.
3. 771 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001).
4. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent:
Comparing Physicians to Each Other, 94 Nw. U. L REv. 1, 1-5 (1999). "With the advent of
more extensive gathering and comparison data, it has become possible to provide
information to patients not only about the risks associated with the procedures for which
consent was sought, but also about the relative risks associated with the medical providers
who would perform those procedures." Id. at 3. Examples of studies supporting the use of
physician-performance data may be found infra at note 70.
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recommended surgery.5
That lone decision, Johnson v. Kokemoor,6 provides the basic
framework upon which the doctrine of informed consent should be
applied in Pennsylvania.7
I. THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT

Since the 1914 decision in Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospital,8 the principle that patients, not physicians, have the right
to determine what is done to their bodies has governed the
interaction between physicians and patients.9 In Schloendorff,
Justice Cardozo articulated the premise that has become known as
the doctrine of informed consent:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what is done with his own body; and a surgeon
who performs an operation without his patient's consent
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages. This is
true, except in cases of emergency where the patient is
5. Id. at 6-7. As argued by Professor Twerski, a patient's informed consent embraces
more than the hypothetical risks of a surgical procedure performed by a hypothetical
surgeon:
When the omitted information concerns risks associated with the particular provider
... the question is not whether the patient would have consented to the procedure in
question (as opposed to some other procedure with a different risk matrix, or as
opposed to the risk of undergoing no procedure at all). Rather, the question is
whether the patient would have consented to the procedure to be performed by this
provider with this provider's level of risk, as opposed to being performed by another
provider with that providers lower level of risk.
Id. at 12.
6. 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
7. Although the superior court's decision in Duttry v. Patterson, 741 A.2d 199 (Pa
Super. CL 1999) embraced the analysis provided in Johnson, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was content to give Johnson only cursory mention in a footnote while deciding the
issue. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1259 n.2.
8. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). In Schloendorff, a patient was operated on while
unconscious and without having given consent to an operation. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93.
9. Id. The requirement of physicians to obtain a patient's informed consent, however, is
often limited by three exceptions:
(1) an emergency exception, which applies when the patient is incapable of
consenting and the imminent harm from forgoing treatment outweighs the harm
threatened by the proposed treatment; (2) a "therapeutic privilege," which applies
when the disclosure of risks would present such a threat of harm to the patient that it
is medically contraindicated; and (3) an exception for risks that ought to be known by
everyone, or that are already known by the particular patient.
Krause, supra note 1, at 279 n.29. Although the emergency exception is also reflected in
Pennsylvania's informed consent statute (the statute begins with the admonition "[elxcept in
emergencies") the application of these exceptions to the general requirement of informed
consent is outside the scope of this comment. 40 PA CoNs STAT. § 1301.811-A (1998).
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unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate before
consent can be obtained.' 0
This demand on physicians to obtain a patient's informed consent
before performing an operation is rooted in the idea that a patient
can make a knowledgeable decision about what happens to his
body only when he is first presented with the material information,
the benefits and risks, about the proposed surgical procedure."
Application of the doctrine of informed consent varies by
jurisdiction. 12 Historically, courts have framed their analyses of
informed consent under legal theories sounding in battery,
negligence, contract, or the fiduciary nature of the doctor/patient
relationship. 3 Although the doctrine of informed consent was
originally developed under the rubric of battery, 14 the negligence
standard has emerged as the preferred standard by which courts
apply the doctrine of informed consent.' 5 Beyond the differences in
10. Schloendorf, 105 N.E. at 93.
11. E.g., Richard A. Heinemann, Note, Pushing the Limits of Informed Consent:
Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1998 WIs. L REV. 1079, 1089.
"Traditional informed consent law was designed to ensure that patients understand the
benefits and risks of proposed treatments." Id. In the first Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
decision to adopt the doctrine of informed consent, Justice O'Brien wrote, "for there to be a
valid consent it must be clear that both parties understand the nature of the undertaking and
what the possible as well as expected results might be." Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 674
(Pa. 1966).
12. Richard E. Shugrue & Kathryn Linstromberg, The Practitioner'sGuide to Informed
Consent, 24 CREIGHTON L REv. 881, 884 (1991).
13. Id. at 884. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (employing a battery
theory); Salgo v. Leland Standford Jr. Univ. Bd. Of Trustees, 317 P2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1957) (employing a negligence theory); Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663 (Pa. 1966)
(employing a contract theory); Gates v. Jensen, 595 P2d 919 (Wash. 1979) (employing a
fiduciary duty theory). See Shugrue, supra note 12, at 889-98 for a discussion of the history
and application of informed consent analysis under each theory.
14. Joan P. Dailey, Comment, The Two Schools of Thought Doctrine and Informed
Consent Doctrines in Pennsylvania: A Model for Integration, 98 DIcK. L. REv. 713, 726
(1994). Under a medical battery theory, the elements for a cause of action for battery require
the patient to prove that "(1) the physician performed a procedure or treatment beyond the
scope of the patient's consent; (2) the treatment provided was substantially different from
that to which the patient agreed; and (3) the physician intentionally deviated from the care
to which the patient agreed." Id.
15. Id. at 732. "[Tlhe great majority of jurisdictions recognize negligence as the proper
basis for an informed consent action." Id. at 729-30. E.g. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772
(D.C. Cir. 1972); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014
(Md. 1977); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A_2d 676 (R.I. 1972). Under the negligence standard, a
patient must show that a physician's failure to disclose information material to a treatment
decision has caused the patient's injury. Shugrue, supra note 12, at 893. Key to the difference
between the application of the informed consent doctrine under the battery and negligence
standard is that only under the battery standard are physicians exposed to liability regardless
of whether the patient incurs a physical injury as a result of the procedure to which he did
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applying the doctrine that rest in choosing a negligence or battery
standard, courts have wrestled with choosing the appropriate
standard by which to prove that consent was or was not given by a
16
patient.
When evaluating whether a patient was provided the material
information adequate to secure his patient's informed consent, the
courts have applied two differing legal standards: (1) the traditional
"professional community" standard; and (2) the "reasonable patient"
standard. 7 Under the "professional community" standard, a
physician must disclose to the patient all information that a
reasonable and minimally competent physician would reveal in the
same situation.' 8 The "reasonable patient" standard, however, is
growing in popularity among the courts.'9 In applying this
patient-oriented approach to informed consent, the court considers
whether a physician has provided to the patient all material
information that a reasonable patient would have deemed
necessary to making his treatment decisions. 20 It has been
not consent. Dailey, supra note 14, at 727.
16. Shugrue, supra note 12, at 884-85.
17. Id. at 885.
18. Id. The following cases represent a cross section of those in which the
"professional community" standard was used: Riedisser v. Nelson, 534 P.2d 1052 (Ariz. 1975);
Fuller v. Starnes, 597 S.W.2d 88 (Ark. 1980); Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907 (Colo. 1982);
Coleman v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), Brown v. Wood, 202 So.2d 125 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Nishi v. Hartwell, 473 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1970); Ziegert v. S. Chi. Cmty.
Hosp., 425 N.E.2d 450 (1l. App. Ct. 1981); Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d
1024 (End. Ct. App. 1981); Tatro v. Lueken, 512 P.2d 529 (Kan. 1973); Woolley v. Henderson,
418 A.2d 1123 (Me. 1980); Marchlewicz v. Stanton, 213 N.W.2d 317 (Mich. App. 1973); Cress v.
Mayer, 626 S.W.2d 430 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Llera v. Wisner, 557 P.2d 805 (Mont. 1976); Folger
v. Corbett, 394 A.2d 63 (N.H. 1978); Butler v. Berkeley, 213 S.E.2d 571 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975);
German v. Nichopoulos, 577 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); Bly v. Rhoads, 222 S.E.2d 783
(Va. 1976); Stundon v. Stadnik, 469 P.2d 16 (Wyo. 1970). See also Mary Anne Bobinski,
Autonomy and Privacy: ProtectingPatientsfrom their Physicians, 55 U. Prrr. L REv. 291,
343 (1994) (indicating the "professional community" standard "presents some formidable
hurdles for [patients], who must present expert medical testimony to show that minimally
competent physicians would have disclosed the provider-associated risk at issue").
19. See also L Rachel Lerman Helyar & Judith E. Gordon, Courts Divided Over
Physicians'Duty to Disclose Their 'Track Records' to Patients, 17 MED. MAILPRACICE LAw No.
3 (January 2000). Courts have turned to the "reasonable patient" approach in Connecticut,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont.
See Heinemann, supra note 11, at 1082 n.15. See Pedersen v. Vahidy, 552 A.2d 419 (Conn.
1989); Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987); Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher, 553 So.2d 398 (La. 1989); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Precourt v.
Frederick, 481 N.E.2d 1144 (Mass. 1985); Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1993);
Wheeldon v. Madison, 374 N.W.2d 367 (S.D. 1985); Ramon v. Farr, 770 P2d 131 (Utah 1989);
Small v. Gifford Mem'l Hosp., 349 A.2d 703 (Vt. 1975).
20. The following cases employed the "reasonable patient" approach: Canterbury, 464
F2d 772; Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass'n, 465 A.2d 294 (Conn. 1983); Revord v. Russell, 401
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observed, however, that the "reasonable patient" standard has been
"difficult to apply in practice." 21 Commentators have begun to focus
on the possible ineffectiveness of the traditional objective
application of this standard and have given consideration to what
information the actual patient involved in the decision-making
process desires.2
UI. INFORMED CONSENT IN PENNSYLVANIA

Although the Pennsylvania legislature recently enacted 40 PACONS. STAT. § 1301.811-A (1998), a codification of the law of
informed consent, there has yet to be any interpretation in case
law or scholarly writing regarding the statute's impact on whether a
physician's training or personal experience is relevant to an
informed consent analysis2 Therefore, prior caselaw must be
N.E.2d 763 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Cowman v. Hornaday, 329 N.W.2d 422 (Iowa 1983); Percle v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349 So.2d 1289 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 350 So.2d 1218
(La. 1977); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014 (Md. 1977); Harnish v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr.,
439 N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1982); Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488 (Miss. 1987); Largey v. Rothman,
540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988); Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180 (N.M. 1978); Congrove v. Holmes,
308 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio Misc. 1973); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1979); Getchell v.
Mansfield, 489 P2d 953 (Or. 1971); Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct 1971);
Cunningham v. Yankton Clinic, 262 N.W.2d 508 (S.D. 1978); Miller v. Kennedy, 272, 522 P.2d
852 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). See also Dailey, supra note 14, at 729. See also Shugrue, supra
note 12, at 885-86. The "reasonable patient" standard was first developed in Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) and stresses the "patient's autonomy and right to
self-determination." Shugrue, supra note 12, at 885.
21. Heinemann, supra note 11, at 1083. Traditionally, the "reasonable patient" approach
has focused on an objective measure of what a theoretical patient, not the actual patient in
question, would objectively require in order to make treatment decisions. Id.
22. Id. A problem with applying a the objective approach to the "reasonable patient"
standard involves the "virtual impossib[ility] to determine what a hypothetical, 'reasonable'
patient would have done in similar circumstances." Id. at 1084. See also infra notes 64-68
and accompanying text.
23. The decision in Duttry did not involve an analysis of the statute because Duttry's
surgery was performed long before the statute was enacted. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1258 n.1.
Pennsylvania's informed consent statute reads as follows:
(a) Except in emergencies, a physician owes a duty to a patient to obtain the
informed consent of the patient or the patient's authorized representative prior to
conducting the following procedures:
(1) Performing surgery, including the related administration of anesthesia.
(2) Administering radiation or chemotherapy.
(3) Administering a blood transfusion.
(4) Inserting a surgical device or appliance.
(5) Administering an experimental medication, using an experimental device or
using an approved medication or device in an experimental manner. (b) Consent is
informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure set forth in
subsection (a) and the risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would
require to make an informed decision as to that procedure. The physician shall be
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examined to carve out the doctrine of informed consent in
Pennsylvania.
Despite the national trend of applying a negligence standard to
informed consent analyses, the courts of Pennsylvania have held
close to its battery-based approach to the doctrine of informed
consent.24 Even within the framework of battery, however,
Pennsylvania implemented the more progressive "reasonable
patient" standard during a time when most jurisdictions employed
the "professional community" standard.25 From its 1971 inception
into Pennsylvania jurisprudence, the "reasonable patient" standard
has been viewed by Pennsylvania courts to provide more equitable
relief than the "professional community" standard to patients
bringing suits under the doctrine of informed consent.26 The
Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Cooper v. Roberts,27 found that:
the standard of disclosure exercised by the medical
community [on which the "professional community" standard
is based] was inequitable for two reasons: (1) the standard
failed to consider the amount of knowledge a particular
patient may require to make an informed consent, and (2) the
patient's expense and suffering should not be subordinated to
the self-imposed standards of a medical community whose
entitled to present evidence of the description of that procedure and those risks and
alternatives that a physician acting in accordance with accepted medical standards of
medical practice would provide. (c) Expert testimony is required to determine
whether the procedure constituted the type of procedure set forth in subsection (a)
and to identify the risks of that procedure, the alternatives to that procedure and the
risks of these alternatives. (d) A physician is liable for failure to obtain the informed
consent only if the patient proves that receiving such information would have been a
substantial factor in the patient's decision whether to undergo a procedure set forth in
subsection (a).
40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301.811-A (1998).
24. Dailey, supra note 14, at 733. "Despite the nationwide trend toward establishing a
negligence standard for informed consent actions, Pennsylvania courts have stubbornly
refused to forsake the battery standard. Id. See Bryan J. Warren, Comment, Pennsylvania
Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call to Protect Patient Autonomy Rights by Abandoning
the Battery Approach, 38 DuQ. L REv. 917 (2000) for a detailed discussion of the history of
informed consent in Pennsylvania, as well as a persuasive argument that Pennsylvania
should adopt the negligence standard in informed consent analyses.
25. Dailey, supra note 14, at 731. The 1971 superior court decision in Cooper v.
Roberts, set the "reasonable patient" approach as the standard for informed consent
disclosure in Pennsylvania. 286 A.2d 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
26. Id. In Cooper, the superior court compared the more traditionally employed
"professional community" standard to the newly adopted "reasonable patient" standard and
ruled that the more patient oriented "reasonable patient" approach was more equitable. Id. at
650.
27. Id. at 647.
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2
conspiracy of silence is notoriously difficult to overcome. 8

Pennsylvania courts have often addressed the nature of "material
information" in the context of a physician's duty to obtain a
patient's informed consent. 29 It was only in the recently decided
Duttry v. Patterson,30 however, that the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania considered whether the material information relevant
to a patient's ability to give his informed consent includes a
"surgeon's personal qualifications and experience" in performing a
32
medical procedure.3 1 Overruling the superior court's decision,
Justice Cappy wrote that the "information personal to the
physician, whether solicited by the patient or not, is irrelevant to
the doctrine of informed consent."33
28. Dailey, supra note 14, at 731 n. 133 (discussing the impact of the Cooper decision).
29. When interpreting the doctrine of informed consent, the Pennsylvania courts have
consistently held that the material information on which a patient's informed consent is
predicated must enable the patient to make reasonable health care decisions. Cosom v.
Marcotte, 760 A.2d 886, 892 (Pa. Super Ct. 2000). "The primary focus of Pennsylvania law
with respect to informed consent is to guarantee that a patient is supplied with all the
material facts from which an intelligent choice as to medical attention may be reached,
regardless of whether the patient chooses rationally." Id. at 892. The courts have described
material information in the following ways:
Our conclusion does not require a physician to apprise [sic] a patient of every minute
detail concerning the surgical implantation of a medical device. Rather, the patient
need only be apprised [sic] of such material information as is necessary to determine
whether to proceed with the surgical or operative procedure or remain in the present
condition.
Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Center, 758 A.2d 1238, 1246 (Pa. Super. Ct 2000).
We have held that a physician or surgeon who fails to advise a patient of material
facts, risks, complications and alternatives to surgery which a reasonable [person] in
the patient's position would have considered significant in deciding whether to have
the operation is liable for damages which ensue, and the patient need not prove that a
causal relationship exists between the physician's or surgeon's failure to disclose
information and the patient's consent to undergo surgery.
Sinclair by Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1140 (Pa. 1993).
We do not believe that requiring physicians and surgeons to communicate material
facts, risks, complications and alternatives to their patients creates an unduly
burdensome requirement. A physician or surgeon need not disclose all known
information; however, the physician or surgeon is required to advise the patient of
those material facts, risks, complications and alternatives to surgery that a reasonable
person in the patient's situation would consider significant in deciding whether to
have the operation. Thus, the patient is assured that he will be provided with "all the
material facts from which he can make an intelligent choice as to his course of
treatment, regardless of whether he in fact chooses rationally."
Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 1992) (citation omitted).
30. 771 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001).
31. Id. at 1257.
32. Duttry v. Patterson, 741 A.2d 199 (Pa Super. Ct. 1999).
33. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1259.
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Ill. COMPARING DUTTRY TO JOHNSON

The issue decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
Duttry required a determination of whether information about a
surgeon's experience in performing a specific operation is
"material" to the patient's ability to make an informed treatment
decision.3 4 In Duttry, Mrs. Cloma Duttry ("Duttry") sought medical
care from Dr. Lewis T. Patterson ("Patterson") after being
diagnosed with esophageal cancer. 4 After discussing treatment
options with Patterson, Duttry consented to Patterson's
performance of a surgical procedure in which part of Duttry's
esophagus and stomach were to be resected.6 Because of
complications resulting from the surgery, Duttry required
additional, emergency surgery.37 Duttry alleged that she developed
Adult Respiratory Disease Syndrome ("ARDS") as a result of the
surgical complications and the need for emergency surgery.38 The
ARDS left Duttry with permanent damage to her lungs, which
prohibited her from continuing to work.3
Duttry brought suit against Patterson alleging claims of medical
malpractice and a lack of informed consent.4 Critical to the
decisions made by both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and
superior court was Duttry's claim that during her discussion with
Patterson about the operation she asked the physician about his
41
prior experience in performing the operation he recommended.
Although Patterson allegedly assuaged Duttry's concerns by telling
her that he had "performed this particular procedure approximately
once every month," Duttry attempted to introduce evidence at trial
to establish that Patterson had, in fact, only performed the type of
surgery performed on Duttry "nine times in the preceding five
42
years."
34. Id. at 1257. "The question with which we are presented is whether the superior
court erred as a matter of law when it determined that information concerning a surgeon's
personal qualifications and experience is relevant to an informed consent claim." Id.
35. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1256.
36. Id.
37. Id. Three days after the surgery was performed a leak, which had developed at the
site of the surgery, grew and became a rupture. Id.
38. Id.
39. Duttry, 741 A.2d at 200.
40. Duttry, 771 A-2d at 1257. In addition to naming Patterson in the suit, Duttry named
Patterson Surgical Associates and the Polyclinic Medical Center. Duttry, 741 A.2d at 200.
Prior to a decision in the case, the parties agreed to dismiss the Polyclinic Medical Center.
Id.
41. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1256.
42. Id. at 1257. The trial court, however, would not allow Duttry to introduce this
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Though Duttry found momentary reprieve from the superior
court's reversal of the jury's decision in favor of Patterson, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the superior court's
decision. 43 In contrast to the results in Duttry, Ms. Donna Johnson
("Johnson"), a patient who brought an informed consent action
against her physician in Johnson v. Kokemoor,44 found ultimate
relief from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's reversal of the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision for the physician. In Johnson,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered the issue of whether a
physician failed to obtain Johnson's informed consent prior to
surgery when the physician failed to divulge his true level of
experience in performing the type of operation he recommended to
her, as well as having failed to compare the rates of patient
survival and success regarding the performance of this operation by
45
experienced and inexperienced surgeons.
After being diagnosed with an enlarging brain aneurysm, Johnson
sought the medical advice and care of Dr. Richard Kokemoor
("Kokemoor"). 46 When Kokemoor recommended to Johnson that
she undergo surgery to clip the aneurysm, Johnson agreed, but only
after asking the physician about his experience in performing the
surgery.47 The surgery performed by Kokemoor left Johnson an
incomplete quadriplegic, 48 and she brought suit against Kokemoor
for overstating his surgical experience during doctor-patient
consultations. 49 At trial, Johnson introduced evidence that
Kokemoor, in response to her questions about his experience in
performing the recommended surgery, told Johnson that he had
performed the surgery "dozens" of times.50 The physician had
evidence, ruling that it was "not relevant to the issue of informed consent." Id.
Foreshadowing the sentiments of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the trial court "reasoned
that the only information that a physician must impart to a patient to obtain informed
consent is information relative to the risks of the procedure itself." Id. As evidenced by the
trial court's ruling, "information regarding the personal skills and abilities of the physician is
not relevant to understanding the risks of the procedure itself." Id.
43. Id.
44. 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996).
45. Id. at 497. Although not relevant to this discussion, the Johnson court also
considered whether the physician violated the doctrine of informed consent when he failed
"to refer the plaintiff to a tertiary care facility staffed by physicians more experienced in
performing the same surgery." Id.
46. Id. at 499.
47. Id.
48. Id. Johnson "remains unable to walk or to control her bowel or bladder movements
...
[and] her vision, speech and upper body coordination are partially impaired." Id.
49. Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 499.
50. Id.
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actually performed aneurysm surgery a total of nine times.51 In
support of Johnson's contention that Kokemoor's lack of
experience would have affected her treatment decision, a medical
expert testified that "experience and skill with the [surgeon] is
more important when performing basilar tip aneurysm surgery than
with any other neurosurgical procedure."52
With very similar factual situations underlying the decisions in
Duttry and Johnson, the two courts reached very different
conclusions. The conflicting results are due in large part to each
court's interpretation of what constitutes the "material information"
upon which a patient's informed consent is contingent. The Duttry
court, drawing from previous Pennsylvania case law in which the
nature of material information was discussed,5 concluded that the
only information necessary for a physician to impart to a patient in
order to conform with the requirements of informed consent is the
"nature of the operation to be performed, the seriousness of it, the
organs of the body involved, the disease or incapacity sought to be
4 Though the Pennsylvania
cured, and the possible results."M
Supreme Court found that evidence of a physician's
experience-related information is irrelevant to a patient's ability to
provide informed consent,1 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
disagreed. In Johnson, the Court concluded "a reasonable person in
[Johnson's]
position
would have
considered
such
[experience-related] information material in making an intelligent
and informed decision about the surgery."56
Regardless of whether a court employs the objective or
subjective model of the "reasonable patient" standard, 57 a healthy
judge or jury may find it difficult to contemplate what information
will prove essential to a patient's informed consent decision.
Although courts generally agree that the theoretical medical risks
and benefits associated with an operation must be presented to a
patient,M courts and legal commentators have not been able to
reach a consensus with respect to a physician's personal
characteristics. 59 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that an
51.

Id.

52.

Id.

53. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
54. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1258.
55. Id. at 1259.
56. Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 505.
57. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
58. See Shugrue, supra note 12.
59. See Twersld, supra note 4. In Pennsylvania, the trend has been to view "material
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inclusion of such information would be "highly problematic" 60
because a determination of the information that is material to the
"reasonable person"61 is based upon an objective, rather than a
subjection analysis, and this objective analysis "does not shift ...
on how inquisitive or passive the particular patient is."62 The court's
argument here63 however is founded on the superior court's
decision in Kaskie v. Wright," which involved a physician's
nondisclosure of his alcoholism.6
The degree to which
physician-experience data can predict future surgical outcomes is
not based upon the extraneous personal qualities of the physician;
this data is based on physician training and the volume of surgery
previously performed.6 As such, the supreme court's attempt to
analogize Kaskie to Duttry seems overbroad and generalized.
67
Although the Duttry decision implies that the "possible results"
of a surgical procedure, a factor that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court does require physicians to address with patients, are not
affected by the relative skill of the operating physician, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court embriced a more expansive view of
what the reasonable patient considers material when evaluating a
procedure's risk and potential outcome. With regard to Kokemoor's
overstatement of his surgical experience to Johnson, as well as
Kokemoor's failure to inform her of the "availability of other
[medical] centers and physicians better able to perform [her]
procedure," 68 the court held that provision of such information
would have "facilitated Johnson's awareness of 'all of the viable
alternatives' available to her and thereby aided her exercise of
informed consent."6
Specifically addressing the nature of
information that is material to a patient's informed consent to
information" in a traditionally narrow vane. Dailey, supra note 14, at 732. See Malloy v.
Shanahan, 421 A-2d 803 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (stating the doctrine of informed consent does
not apply to a physician's advice and treatment with respect to therapeutic drugs), and
Kaside v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct 1991) (holding surgeon did not violate the
doctrine of informed consent when he did not reveal to patient his alcoholism and
unlicensed status).
60. Duttry, 771 A-2d at 1269.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1258.
64. 589 A.2d 213 (1991).
65. Id.
66. See supra note 84.
67. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1258.
68. Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 498.
69. Id.
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surgery, the court stated:
A reasonable disclosure of significant risks . . . requires an
assessment of and communication regarding the gravity of the
patient's condition, the probabilities of success, and any
alternative treatment or procedures of such are reasonably
appropriate so that the patient has the information reasonably
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent and informed
consent to the proposed treatment or procedure. 70
This more inclusive conception of the information that may
affect a reasonable patient's treatment decision was tempered with
the admonition that the court's decision does not impose a blanket
requirement of physicians to always provide patients with
"comparative risk evidence in statistical terms to obtain informed
consent."71 The court's holding, as well as its reference to the
application of the doctrine of informed consent as "fact-driven and
context specific," 72 does, however, reflect the important
consideration, on a case-by-case basis, whether such information
would have been critical to a patient's decision to provide
consent. 73
The Johnson decision relied, in part, on the application of
Wisconsin's informed consent statute. 74 The Duttry decision did not
70. Id. at 502 (citation omitted).
71. Id. at 507.
72. Id. at 508.
73. See Johnson, at 507. The court refused to implement "a bright line rule excluding
evidence of comparative risk relating to the provider." Id. at 506. "[W]e hold that evidence of
morbidity and mortality outcomes of different physicians was admissible under the
circumstances of this case." Id. at 507. Exemplifying the importance of such as
consideration, the court stated that "while there may be a general risk of ten percent that a
particular surgical procedure will result in paralysis or death, that risk may climb to forty
percent when the particular procedure is performed by a relatively inexperienced surgeon."
Id. In the court's opinion, "the second statistic would be material to the patient's exercise of
an intelligent and informed consent regarding treatment options." Id.
74. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.30 (West 1993-94). Wisconsin's informed consent statute reads
as follows:
Any physician who treats a patient shall inform the patient about the availability of all
alternate, viable medical modes of treatment and about the benefits and risks of these
treatments. The physician's duty to inform the patient under this section does not
require disclosure of:
(1) Information beyond what a reasonably well-qualified physician in a similar
medical classification would know.
(2) Detailed technical information that in all probability a patient would not
understand.
(3) Risks apparent or known to the patient.
(4) Extremely remote possibilities that might falsely or detrimentally alarm the
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rely on Pennsylvania's statute. 75 The only notable difference
between the two statutes, however, appears to be Pennsylvania's
requirement that the patient must prove "that receiving [material]

information would have been a

SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR

in the patient's

[treatment] decision."76 It is possible, however, that the
Pennsylvania statute's failure to delineate a patient's appreciation of
his physician level of surgical experience as a "substantial factor"
would not affect the court's consideration of whether such
information is material to a patient's informed consent decision.
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Hondroulis v.
Schumacher77 specifically considered whether a physician's duty to
disclose material risks to a patient is limited solely to the risks
specified in the statute.78 Answering this question in the negative,
the court held that "[although] the statute establishes a rebuttable
presumption of consent to encounter risks described in the
[patient's signed consent] form, [] providers must disclose known
material risks that may foreseeably result in any of the
consequences listed in the statute ... ."79 Again, the key to whether
certain information must be provided to the patient hinges on the
8°
court's understanding of the term "material risk."
IV.

INCLUSION OF PHYSICIAN'S EXPERIENCE RELATED INFORMATION IN
THE INFORMED CONSENT ANALYSIS

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in Duttry, looked beyond
the traditional framework of "material information." Echoing the
sentiment of Johnson, superior court Judge Del Sole determined
that the doctrine of informed consent should require physicians to
patient
(5) Information in emergencies where failure to provide treatment would be more
harmful to the patient than treatment
(6) Information in cases where the patient is incapable of consenting.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 448.30 (West 1993-94).

75. See infra note 23.
76. Id. (emphasis added).
77. 546 So.2d 466 (La. 1989).
78. Hondroutis,546 So.2d at 468.
79. Id. at 475.
80. In determining that a patient's informed consent may extend to information not
specifically delineated in an informed consent statute, courts have based their analyses on
different legal grounds. Hondroulis, 546 So.2d 466 (La. 1989) (focusing on Louisiana's
constitutional right of privacy); Smith v. Weaver, 407 N.W.2d 174 (Neb. 1987) (reconsidering
the central meaning of the law); Natson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960) (holding patient's
right to receive information not listed in the statute should be determined through the
patient's own self-exploration prior to surgery).
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be truthful about their experience in performing the surgery
discussed with patients.8 1 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania
decision in Duttry did, however, draw a distinction between
situations in which a physician provides false information in
response to a patient's affirmative request for a physician's
experience in performing a type of surgery and instances where a
physician simply fails to detail his experience to the patient
without being questioned about it.2 This distinction hinged on the
superior court's prior decision in Kaskie v. Wright.8 Although the
superior court, in Duttry, was not prepared to mandate that
physicians should volunteer personal information to patients, it
concluded differently when a patient such as Duttry affirmatively
questioned a physician about his prior experience:
We too conclude that individuals who question their surgeons
prior to surgery about their competence, experience and
expertise are seeking information that is highly relevant to
them in making an informed decision about their surgeon. A
particular surgeon's skill, which many times is borne by virtue
of experience, is important to those making a choice of their
personal surgeon. Certainly one who questions a physician
about these matters deems the answers important and is
entitled to truthful and accurate information. A surgeon who,
when answering a patient's inquiries, misinforms the patient
about this information and misleads the patient into believing
that the hands of an experienced surgeon will be performing
the operation, does not have the true consent of that patient.8
As put forth in the superior court's decision in Duttry, the
patient's understanding of what information is material to his
informed consent to a surgical procedure appears to be plainly
obvious when that patient makes affirmative inquiries for
81. Duttry, 741 A.2d at 201.
82. Id. "We conclude that a reasonable person would consider [experience-related
information] significant and an individual surgeon who provides false information WHEN SO
QUE TONED would be subject to a claim of lack of informed consent" Id. (emphasis added).
83. 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct 1991). In Kaskie, the superior court held that a
physician did not have to voluntarily reveal his level of experience with respect to the
number of times a specific procedure had been performed. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Duttry, acknowledged that the patient in Kaskie did NOT ASK
the physician about his prior surgical experience of qualifications. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1258
(emphasis added).
84. Duttry, 741 A.2d at 201-02.
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information from the physician.85 Implicit to appreciating the
conflicting decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is that the
language traditionally used to describe a patient's right to provide
informed consent prior to surgery remains amorphous. The
language typically employed to describe the patient's right to
informed consent, as well as that which describes the information
material to this decision, is not easily quantifiable. Representative
language includes: "a true understanding of the nature of the
operation to be performed,"86 and "risks . . . that a reasonable
person would consider significant,"87 Although informed consent is
rooted in Justice Cardozo's statement that the patient must
maintain control over what is done to his body, the courts have
limited the patient's ability to make informed decisions about his
real-life ailment to considerations of theoretical risk and benefit. Is
it truly possible for the reasonable patient to "understand the
nature of the undertaking"88 without an appreciation of the skill
possessed by the physician, especially if this information has been
shown to affect surgical outcomes?
Scientific studies have consistently shown that better surgical
outcomes result from physicians who possess greater experience in
performing the surgery8 9 The value of such experience-related
information has not escaped the notice of the scientific and
medical community.90 As the empirical data suggests, it is not
unreasonable to assume that a patient may be concerned with his
physician's experience. 91 This is true because the patient's outcome
may be directly. related to the surgical experience of the operating
85. Id. at 202.
86. Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (Pa. 1966).
87. Gouse v. Cassel, 615 A.2d 331, 334 (Pa. 1992). The court used similar language in
Foflygen v. Allegheny Gen. Hosp., 723 A.2d 705, 708 (Pa- Super Ct. 1999); and Bilebault v.
DiBattiste, No. CIV. A. 96-6501, 1999 WL 191648, at *3 (E.D. Pa. March 29, 1999).
88. Gray, 223 A.2d 663.
89. Twerski, supra note 4, at 13 n.30. Here, the authors list eight studies in which
patient outcomes are shown to be directly related to the volume of surgeries performed. Id.
See also Julie Ann Sosa, MD et al., The Importance of Surgeon Experience for Clinical and
Economic Outcomes From Thyroidectomy, 228 Annals of Surgery 320 (September 1998);
James A. O'Neill Jr, MD et al., A Longitudinal Analysis of the Pediatric Workforce, 232
Annals of Surgery Number 3 (September 2000); Douglas Sharrott, Note, Provider-Specific
Quality-of-Care Data A Proposal for Limited Mandatory Disclosure, 58 BROOK L REv. 85

(1992).
90. Twersd, supra note 4, at 13.
91. Sharrot, supra note 70, at 89. "Proponents of public disclosure contend that the
public has a right to know this information since such information will encourage patients to
make more informed decisions about which hospital and physicians to select for treatment."
Id.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:543

surgeon. Justice Cappy's very language in the Duttry decision,
which states that information qualifies as material to the patient
when it "impart[s] information relative only to the surgery itself,"92
would seem to support the inclusion of physician-performance
information if this information is actually shown to reflect surgical
outcomes. It then appears axiomatic that experience-related
information, especially when that information is requested by the
patient, should fall within the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
understanding of what a patient must be told regarding the "nature
of the operation to be performed." 93
Although the supreme court did state that its holding in Duttry
"should hot . . . be read to stand for the proposition that a
physician who misleads a patient is immune from suit,"9 the court's
insistence that an action in negligence or misrepresentation will
sufficiently protect a patient's interests may not reflect an
appreciation of the interest protected by the doctrine of informed
consent. Justice Cardozo's original invocation of patients' rights
requires that a physician be prevented from providing surgical care
without prior approval from the patient. Unless, prior to the
performance of surgery, physicians are saddled with a duty to
address the extent of their surgical experience with the patient, the
patient is stripped of his ability to address reasonable concerns
relating to competence. 95 This is particularly true when a patient
specifically questions the physician about his past surgical
experience. A cause of action for misrepresentation may provide
some harmed patients with a viable recourse against an
inexperienced physician, but it is only the doctrine of informed
consent that has been specifically tailored through years of judicial
interpretation to address the intricacies of doctor-patient
interaction.9
92. Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1259.
93. Id. at 1258.
94. Id. at 1259.
95. The requirement of informed consent addresses the physician's actions prior to
surgery. Misrepresentation would better serve the needs of patients if physicians falsely
report their experience-data to the National Practitioner Data Bank; patients, however, do
not currently have access to the such information. Jean Hellwege, Law of Informed Consent
Poised for Revolution, Experts Say, 36 TRIL 128, 129 (July 2000).
96. Additionally, the duty imposed upon physicians by the doctrine of informed
consent, as opposed legal pitfalls of misrepresentation, are often addressed during physician
training and by physician organizations in literature to physicians. E.g., SHAWNA C. WILEY, MD,
FACS, STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS TO THE GENERAL AND PLASTIC SURGERY
DEVICES PANEL OF THE MEDICAL DEvIcEs AUTHoRrr COMMnrTEE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
(March 3, 2000). (addressing the elements of informed consent required prior to breast
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Furthermore, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in Taylor v.
Albert Einstein Medical Center,97 held that "Pennsylvania law
permits a patient to specifically limit his or consent to an invasive
procedure to a particular surgeon."98 If a patient enjoys the right to
provide his consent only to a particular surgeon, is it proper for a
court to limit this right of selection when a physician misrepresents
his experience to the patient in order to obtain the patient's
informed consent? As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in
Johnson, "[tihe question of whether certain information is material
to a patient's decision and therefore requires disclosure is rooted in
the facts and circumstances of the particular case in which in
arises."99 The supreme court's decision in Duttry prematurely
presumes that the facts and circumstances surrounding all medical
decisions will not involve the patient having a genuine interest in
his physician's professional experience.
CONCLUSION

A patient's decision to undergo surgery, let alone his decision to
choose a particular surgeon, will often be made only following
careful consideration of many treatment options. As such, the
doctrine of informed consent must begin to protect patients'
opportunity cost.100 When the patient's treatment decision relies on
an misplaced appreciation of his surgeon's experience, thereby
implicating the actual, as opposed to the theoretical, success rate
augmentation surgery); PATRICK B. CURAN, RESIDENTS ASSISTING IN SURGERY: USE CAUTION
(OUM PODIATRIST PROGRAM NEWS) (addressing whether surgeons should inform patients about
the assistance of residents during surgery).
97. 723 A2d 1027 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 754 A.2d 650 (Pa.
2000).
98. Taylor, 723 A.2d at 1034. In explaining its holding, the superior court stated:
"Since Appellant has alleged facts which, if true, established that consent was not given To
BAIIS AND/OR QUIGLEY to perform the surgery in the manner in which it occurred, he has
thereby alleged sufficient facts to establish a cause of action for battery against them." Id. at
1035 (emphasis added).
99. Johnson, 545 N.W.2d at 504-05. As is also true in Pennsylvania, the application of
the doctrine of informed consent in Wisconsin is based upon the "reasonable patient"
standard. Id. at 504.
100. Opportunity cost is defined as "Itihe value of the best alternative which is
foregone in order to get ... more of the commodity under consideration." SHERmAN FOU.AND
ET AL, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 603 (2d ed. 1997). In the case of a patient's
decision to undergo surgery, only one physician or group of physicians can perform the
operation. If the patient elects to have a particular physician operate, then the patient
forgoes the opportunity to have that operation performed by any other physician. When the
experience and skills of the chosen physician are questionable, the patient's recovery may be
affected.
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of the treatment, the patient suffers in three respects: (1) The
surgery performed on the patient may not actually provide the level
of results expressed by the surgeon; (2) The patient forgoes the
potentially greater benefit associated with a more experienced
surgeon having performed the surgery; and (3) The patient forgoes
the ability to choose an altogether different treatment option, the
success rate of which may have been greater than that of electing
surgery with an inexperienced surgeon. Patients, in order to fully
appreciate a given procedure's opportunity cost, must be told about
the potential success of a given treatment option as performed by a
particular physician.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's interpretation of what
information is material to a reasonable patient's informed consent
decision fails to consider the effects of scientific advancement in
the area of surgical outcomes and physician-experience data. When
the significance of such information extends beyond the perception
of the medical and scientific communities, the average health care
consumer may become savvier in his decision to approach a
particular surgeon or hospital. At that time, the patient's
appreciation of the relationship between his surgeon's experience
and the potential success of a surgical procedure will certainly be a
factor that the reasonable patient will consider before electing
surgery. Though the degree to which the lay community presently
appreciates the connection between a physician's training, practical
experience, and success rate is not certain, the culturally embedded
maxim that "Practice Makes Perfect" suggests that a patient may
reasonably expect that a physician's proficiency will be related to
the extent of his professional experience. Until physicians are
bound to address patients' concerns about how the their level of
experience will affect surgical outcomes, any patient cannot give
true informed consent.
Brad M. Rostolsky

